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A central assumption of open economy macro models with nominal rigidities relates to the currency
in which goods are priced, whether there is so-called producer currency pricing or local currency pricing.
This has important implications for exchange rate pass-through and optimal exchange rate policy.
We show, using novel transaction level information on currency and prices for U.S. imports, that even
conditional on a price change, there is a large difference in the pass-through of the average good priced
in dollars (25%) versus non-dollars (95%). This finding is contrary to the assumption in a large class
of models that the currency of pricing is exogenous and is evidence of an important selection effect
that results from endogenous currency choice. We describe a model of optimal currency choice in
an environment of staggered price setting and show that the empirical evidence strongly supports the
model's predictions of the relation between currency choice and pass-through. We further document
evidence of significant real rigidities, with the pass-through of dollar pricers increasing above 50%
in the long-run. Lastly, we numerically illustrate the currency choice decision in both a Calvo and
a menu-cost model with variable mark-ups and imported intermediate inputs and evaluate the ability






















In the open economy macro literature with nominal rigidities, the currency in which goods
are priced has important implications for the pass-through of exchange rates into traded
goods prices and for optimal exchange rate policy. In a large class of models, the currency
of pricing is exogenous. That is, prices are exogenously set either in the producer currency
or in the local currency.1 In such models, the di®erence in pass-through is a short-run
phenomenon. In the short run, when prices are rigid, pass-through into import prices of
goods priced in the producer's currency is 100% and it is 0% for goods priced in the local
currency. However, when prices adjust, there is no di®erence in pass-through.
We show, using novel transaction level information on currency and prices for U.S. im-
ports, that even conditional on a price change, there is a large di®erence in the pass-through
of the average good priced in dollars (25%) versus non-dollars (95%). This ¯nding is contrary
to the assumption of a large literature that assumes the currency of pricing is exogenous. It
is evidence of an important selection e®ect and is consistent with a separate literature on
endogenous currency choice recently reviewed in Engel (2006). In this environment, the dif-
ference in pass-through between producer currency pricing (PCP) and local currency pricing
(LCP) ¯rms persists even conditional on adjusting prices. Evidence of this selection e®ect
reduces the importance of the direct e®ect of nominal rigidities in explaining di®erences in
pass-through across the di®erent pricing regimes.
Given the observed strong relationship between currency of pricing and measured pass-
through at di®erent horizons, we explore both theoretically and empirically the relation
between currency choice and pass-through in this paper. The paper is structured as follows.
To motivate our analysis, we ¯rst show, in Section 2, using aggregate price index regressions
that the di®erence in pass-through into U.S. import prices of the average good priced in
dollars versus the average good priced in non-dollars is large at horizons starting from 1
month all the way out to 24 months. The pass-through into dollar (non-dollar) priced goods
is close to 0 (1) in the short-run and is 0.14 (0.92) at 24 months. The di®erence therefore
declines from 1 in the short-run to around 0.75 at 24 months. Such sizeable and signi¯cant
di®erences are shown to hold for individual countries exporting to the U.S. across dollar and
non-dollar goods. The feature that short-run pass-through is dramatically di®erent, when
prices have not adjusted, is consistent with currency choice being exogenous or endogenous.
However, the ¯nding that even at horizons of 24 months this di®erence persists is evidence
of an important selection e®ect that arises when currency choice is endogenous.
1For instance, Obstfeld and Rogo® (1995) assume producer currency pricing, Betts and Devereux (2000)
and Chari, Kehoe, and McGrattan (2002) assume local currency pricing. Devereux and Engel (2003) allow
prices to be exogenously set both in local and producer currencies.
1Next, we describe in Section 3, a model of optimal currency choice in an environment of
staggered price setting. There exists a large literature on optimal currency choice as surveyed
in Engel (2006)2 who also presented an important equivalence result between optimal pass-
through and the optimal currency of pricing.3 However, the analysis in the literature has
been conducted in a static environment where prices are pre-set only one period in advance.
We consider here a dynamic multi-period staggered price setting model. In this environment,
we make a distinction between optimal pass-through when the ¯rm adjusts its price but all
other ¯rms have not adjusted and the optimal long-run (or °exible price) pass-through when
all ¯rms have fully adjusted their prices. Currency choice is shown to depend on the pass-
through conditional on the ¯rst instance of price adjustment to the exchange rate shock. We
refer to this as the medium-run pass-through and it is determined by both the dynamic path
of desired pass-through and the duration of non-adjustment. Currency choice cannot be
predicted solely by long-run pass-through or desired pass-through on impact of the exchange
rate shock. This result does not depend on the speci¯c source of incomplete pass-through,
that is if it is variable mark-ups, imported inputs, decreasing returns to scale in production,
etc. If real rigidities in the pricing decisions of ¯rms are important, medium-run pass-through
can di®er from long-run pass-through. Speci¯cally, a ¯rm with a high °exible price (long-
run) pass-through can well choose local currency pricing if real rigidities lead to a low desired
pass-through in the short-run.
We then use the model to derive pricing equations that can be used to estimate the pass-
through coe±cients that a®ect the currency choice decision. Previous empirical work on
currency choice has been limited by the lack of su±ciently disaggregated data on prices and
currency of denomination. As Engel (2006) pointed out, without detailed price data, it is
hard to disentangle the e®ect of nominal from real rigidities on exchange rate pass-through.
We remedy this by using unpublished micro-data on ¯rm level import prices collected by the
Bureau of Labor Statistics for the U.S., for the period 1994-2005. There are several reasons
why this data is particularly suited to our analysis. Firstly, there is reported transaction level
currency information which is unique to this database. Secondly, we observe the individual
goods price series and therefore can condition our analysis on the instances when prices
change, which is required to estimate a theoretically appropriate measure of pass-through
2The papers in this literature include Giovannini (1988); Friberg (1998); Bacchetta and van Wincoop
(2003, 2005); Devereux, Engel, and Storgaard (2004); Corsetti and Pesenti (2004); Goldberg and Tille
(2005).
3The intuition for this result is as follows: Currency choice is essentially a zero-one indexing decision of
¯rm's price to exchange rate shocks. If prices adjust every period, currency choice is irrelevant. However
when prices are sticky, the ¯rm can use currency choice to make its price closer to the desired price in periods
when the ¯rm does not adjust it. Producer (local) currency pricing assures 100% (0%) pass-through in the
short run, prior to price adjustment. Therefore, the higher is the desired pass-through in the short-run, the
higher are the gains from pricing in producer currency compared to local currency.
2for currency choice.
The empirical analysis in Section 4 provides strong support for the theoretical mapping
between currency choice and medium-run exchange rate pass-through. We show that condi-
tioning on a price change, the elasticity of response of prices to the cumulative exchange rate
change over the period of non-adjustment is only 25% for dollar pricers as compared to 95%
for non-dollar pricers. Secondly, we ¯nd evidence of signi¯cant real rigidities for dollar priced
goods that mutes the initial response of ¯rms' prices to exchange rate shocks. We ¯nd that
exchange rate shocks that took place prior to the most recent period of non-adjustment have
strong and signi¯cant e®ects on current price adjustments. As a result, the pass-through
of dollar pricers increases to above 50% in the long-run. The di®erence in pass-through
between dollar and non-dollar priced goods in the long-run comes down to 42% as opposed
to 70% conditional on the ¯rst price adjustment. The ¯nding that long-run pass-through for
some dollar pricers can be as high as 60% is consistent with the fact that what matters for
currency choice is the medium-run pass-through and not the long-run pass-through.
The empirical results are not speci¯c to a particular model of incomplete pass-through
and stand on their own as facts that need to be matched by models of exchange rate pass-
through. In the ¯nal section, Section 5, we consider a model with two sources of incomplete
long-run pass-through | variable mark-ups arising from Kimball demand preferences and
imported inputs in production. We numerically analyze the behavior of a Calvo and a Menu-
cost models of price setting with these features. We show that a ¯rm is more likely to select
into producer currency pricing the lower the elasticity of its mark-up and the lower the share
of imported inputs in its production cost. For reasonable parameter values we ¯nd that
the model can generate low long-run import pass-through as in the data. In both models,
desired pass-through has an increasing pro¯le which translates into a lower medium-run
pass-through as compared to the long-run pass-through. However, in the menu cost model
the size of this di®erence is small: a ¯rm adjusting on the day of the shock will pass-through
90% of what is optimal in the long run; a ¯rm adjusting 6 months after the shock will already
decide to pass-through the optimal long-run amount. In the Calvo model, the results are
quantitatively di®erent. The medium-run pass-through is about 70% of that in the long-run
which is closer to the empirical estimate of 50% and the long-run is achieved only after
several rounds of price adjustments.
Finally, Section 6 provides a discussion of the results and concludes.
3Data
We use unpublished micro data on import prices collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics
for the period 1994-2005. This data are collected on a monthly basis and have information
on import prices of a very detailed good over time, with details on the country of origin
and the currency of pricing. Details regarding the underlying database are reported in
Gopinath and Rigobon (2007).
In the price survey, the BLS asks ¯rms to report on the currency of denomination of the
price. Gopinath and Rigobon (2007) document that prices are rigid, with a median duration
of 11 months, in the currency in which they are reported as being priced in.4 Around 90%
of U.S. imports in the BLS sample are reported as priced in dollars. This fraction however
varies by country of origin. The fraction of imports in the exporters currency is, for example,
34% from Germany, 16% from U.K. and 13% from Japan. From all developing countries the
share in the exporters currency is close to zero. As is well known, a signi¯cant fraction of
trade takes place intra-¯rm. This database allows us to identify transactions as taking place
intra-¯rm or at arms-length. Since we will test theories of prices that are driven mainly by
market forces we exclude intra-¯rm prices from our analysis.5
In our empirical analysis we include countries that have a non-negligible share of their
exports to the U.S. priced in both dollar and non-dollar currency. This includes Germany,
Switzerland, Italy, Japan, UK, Belgium, France, Sweden, Spain, Austria, Netherlands and
Canada.6 In Table 1 we present the number of goods, country by country, that are invoiced
in dollars (¯rst column), in the exporter's currency (second column), and the fraction of
goods that are invoiced in the exporter's currency (last column).
2 Aggregate ERPT and Currency of Pricing
To motivate our analysis we present estimates of exchange rate pass-through across dollar and
non-dollar priced goods using aggregated price indices that we construct from the underlying
data. We show that the di®erence in pass-through into U.S. import prices of the average
good priced in dollars versus the average good priced in non-dollars is large even at horizons
4This fact suggests that the currency information is meaningful and it is not the case, for instance, that
¯rms price in non-dollars and simply convert the prices into dollars to report to the BLS. For this would
imply that dollar prices would then show a high frequency of adjustment, which is not the case.
5For empirical evidence on the di®erences between intra-¯rm and arms-length transactions, using this
data, see Gopinath and Rigobon (2007) and Neiman (2007).
6We used the following two formal criteria for selection: (1) a country should have at least 10 items priced
in non-dollars; and (2) at least 5% of all items imported from a country should be priced in non-dollars.
4longer than a year.
For each country we construct two separate price indices { one including only goods that
are priced in dollars and the other using only those goods priced in the exporter's currency.
For most countries, for exports to the U.S., these are the only two types of pricing.7 Some
goods are priced in a third currency, but such instances are rare. The index we construct is
un-weighted, since we were not provided with BLS weights at the good level for the whole
period.
We estimate the following standard pass-through speci¯cation,
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where i indexes the country, ¢p is the monthly change in the price index in dollars, ¼ is the
monthly foreign country in°ation using the producer price index, and ¢y is average GDP
growth in the U.S.; n is the number of lags which varies from 1 to 24. Since the data is
monthly, we include up to 24 lags for the nominal exchange rate and foreign in°ation and 3
lags for GDP growth.8
The statistic of interest is the sum of the coe±cients on the nominal exchange rate:
¯(n) ´
Pn
j=0 ¯1;j. These coe±cients re°ect the impact that the current change in the
exchange rate has on the price index of imports over time. The objective is to compare these
estimates across di®erent currency indices as we increase the number of lags included in the
speci¯cation from 1 to 24. Figure 1 depicts the pass-through coe±cients from estimating
a pooled regression of all countries with the number of lags on the x-axis. The line in
the middle depicts the pass-through for the aggregate index. This measure of pass-through
increases from 0.22 with one lag to 0.30 with 24 lags. The feature that at the aggregate
level most of the pass-through takes place in the ¯rst two quarters and levels o® soon after is
consistent with the ¯ndings of Campa and Goldberg (2005) and others who have estimated
pass-through into the U.S. using the BLS price index.
From just this aggregate index, however, it is impossible to discern the role of currency.
Now we consider the separate currency indices. The top line depicts the pass-through for
the non-dollar index. The bottom line is the pass-through for the dollar invoiced index.
The bands represent the 95% con¯dence interval around the point estimate for each lag
speci¯cation. As Figure 1 demonstrates, the regression using only the contemporaneous and
7Some non-dollar items keep their dollar price ¯xed for a few months and then index to the cumulative
exchange rate change. However, these cases are few in number. We have excluded such hybrid cases from
our speci¯cation, however they had little in°uence on the results.
8We have also estimated similar equations including controls for U.S. in°ation and ¯nd that the results
are insensitive to this.











Figure 1: Aggregate ERPT at di®erent horizons by currency
1 month lag of the exchange rate estimates a pass-through of 0.03 for goods priced in dollars
and 0.96 for goods priced in non-dollars. Further, we observe that the pass-through increases
for the dollar items with the inclusion of lags, while it decreases slightly for the non-dollar
index. This is consistent with the pattern of price stickiness documented in the data. Note
that the pass-through into the dollar priced goods is far more gradual than is suggested by
the pass-through into the aggregate index. A striking feature of the plot is that the gap
between pass-through of the dollar and non-dollar index remains large and signi¯cant even
24 months out. At 24 months the pass-through is 0.30, 0.14 and 0.94 respectively for the
aggregate, dollar and non-dollar indices.
In Figure 2, we replicate the aggregate regressions country by country. Notice that the
aggregate level of pass-through varies substantially across countries. This can be seen from
the middle line in the plots. For instance, for Germany, the pass-through is 40 percent in
the short run and increases slightly to 45 percent when 24 lags are included. For Japan
and Italy, the numbers are smaller, as they increase from below 25 percent to 30 percent,
while for Sweden and France pass-through is always smaller than 20 percent. The di®erence
between the pass-through of the dollar and non-dollar index is again quite striking. The
exception to this is Canada where the two pass-through elasticities intersect. Average pass-
through for Canada increases from 20 percent in the short run to almost 60 percent in 24
months, though these numbers are highly imprecisely estimated. For all other countries
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Figure 2: Aggregate ERPT at di®erent horizons by currency from speci¯c countries
the di®erences remain large even at long horizons and for 9 out of the 12 countries the
di®erence is signi¯cant even for the speci¯cation with 24 lags. The two exceptions, other
than Canada, are Austria, and Netherlands for which there is simply not enough data to
statistically distinguish the two pass-through elasticities at 24 months horizon. Notice that
7in all other countries the con¯dence intervals for the dollar and non-dollar pass-through do
not intersect.
It is important to emphasize that the average pass-through numbers we obtain (the
middle line) are very close to the numbers estimated using the publicly available BLS price
index. For imports from Japan and Canada the BLS reports a price index starting from
1994. We ¯nd that the measure of aggregate pass-through using our index is very close to
the numbers using the BLS price index. Speci¯cally, using the BLS index, the estimate for
Canada is 57 percent, and it is 31 percent for Japan, while we obtain a pass-through of 0.60
and 0.29 respectively. What we do additionally is to decompose that index by currency of
pricing and we ¯nd that the pass-through elasticities at long horizons are very di®erent for
these two sub-indices.










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8The results in this section demonstrate that unlike the models that assume exogenous
currency choice, exchange rate pass-through of PCP and LCP ¯rms do not equalize even
after most prices have had enough time to adjust. This is evidence of the endogeneity of
currency choice and the signi¯cance of this selection e®ect. This motivates our analysis in
the following sections.
We proceed in the following steps. First, we present a general result on the relation
between currency choice and medium-run pass-through in an environment of staggered price
setting in Section 3.1. We do this without specifying the source of incomplete pass-through,
that is if it is variable mark-ups, imported inputs, decreasing returns to scale in production,
etc. Then in Section 3.2 we introduce two channels of incomplete pass-through | variable
mark-ups and imported inputs. By doing so we demonstrate conditions under which medium-
run pass-through, on which currency choice depends, can di®er from long-run pass-through.
Next, in Section 4 we empirically test the implications of the model for the relation between
currency choice and medium-run pass-through and we also test for the presence of real
rigidities. These empirical results stand on their own as facts that need to be matched by
models of exchange rate pass-through. Until this point we intentionally abstract from speci¯c
models of variable mark-ups and incomplete pass-through, so as to emphasize the generality
of the results. In the ¯nal section, Section 5, we consider a particular source of variable
mark-ups, namely Kimball demand preferences, alongside imported inputs in production to
evaluate the ability of a Calvo and a Menu-cost models of price setting to match the facts
in the data.
3 Currency Choice in a Dynamic Sticky Price Model
In this section we discuss the optimal currency choice for price setting by ¯rms in an environ-
ment with sticky prices, in a partial equilibrium set-up. We allow the ¯rm to choose between
local currency (LCP) and producer currency pricing (PCP). There exists a large literature on
currency choice in environments with prices set one period in advance. Instead, we consider
a multi-period setting and derive new insights which cannot be shown in a one-period model.
While there are several important papers in the theoretical literature on currency choice,9
our paper is most closely related to Engel (2006). Engel (2006) showed that in an environ-
ment with one-period-ahead price setting, °exible price pass-through is a su±cient statistic
for currency choice. Speci¯cally, if the °exible price pass-through is greater than a cer-
tain threshold, the ¯rm should choose producer currency pricing which guarantees complete
9See references in footnote 2.
9short-run pass-through, before the ¯rm adjusts its price. On the other hand, if the °exible
price pass-through is low, the ¯rm should choose local currency pricing which assures zero
pass-through in the short-run.
This section extends the important insight of Engel (2006) and analyzes an environment
with an arbitrary amount of price stickiness. We make a distinction between pass-through
when the ¯rm adjusts its price but all other ¯rms have not adjusted and the long-run (or
°exible price) pass-through when all ¯rms have fully adjusted their prices. In this environ-
ment, currency choice depends on the pass-through conditional on the ¯rst instance of price
adjustment to the exchange rate shock. We refer to this as the medium-run pass-through and
it is a function of the dynamic path of desired pass-through and the frequency of adjustment.
Medium-run pass-through can di®er from the long-run (°exible price) pass-through if real
rigidities such as strategic complementarities in the pricing decisions of ¯rms are important.
Speci¯cally, a ¯rm with a high long-run pass-through can well choose local currency pricing
if strategic complementarities are strong and lead to a low medium-run pass-through.
3.1 Medium-run Pass-through and Currency Choice
We consider here the case of Calvo staggered price setting where a ¯rm who gets to change
its price can also choose the currency in which to price.10 The assumption of Calvo price
setting allows us to characterize analytically the optimal currency choice rule. In Section 5
we will show numerically that the theoretical insights of this section extend to a model with
menu costs and endogenous frequency of price adjustment.11




, where p is the local currency
price of the ¯rm (in logs) and s is the remaining state vector; s can include the industry price
level, demand and cost variables, etc. For now we do not specify what these variables are.
This is left to the next subsection. De¯ne ~ p(s) = argmaxp ¦(p;s) to be the static optimal




. We will refer to ~ p(s) as the desired
price of the ¯rm, i.e. the price that the ¯rm would set if it adjusted every period in the given
environment.12
10We show later the conditions under which the currency choice rule would be the same if currency was
chosen only once during the life of the good.
11According to the empirical evidence in Gopinath and Rigobon (2007), exchange rate movements do not
play a predominant role in explaining the probability of price adjustments. Therefore, the assumption of
exogenous frequency of price adjustment is not very restrictive for the purposes of studying optimal currency
choice decisions.
12There is a di®erence between °exible price and desired price. When we say °exible price, we imply that
the ¯rm operates in a °exible price environment which imposes a certain selection criteria on the set of states
s that can be consistent with the °exible price equilibrium (in particular, since the sectoral price level can
be part of the state space). When we say desired price, we refer to the pricing decision of a °exible-price
10Denote the history of the states by st = (s0;:::;st). The state space can be segmented
into st = (et;ht), where et is the log of the exchange rate13 and ht contains the remaining
state variables. Further, we assume that the exchange rate follows an exogenous random
walk process.14 Nevertheless, state variables ht can be correlated with current or past shocks
to the exchange rate and can exhibit arbitrary amount of persistence. We assume that the
¯rm discounts the future at a constant rate ±.
Consider a ¯rm that decides to set its current price in the local currency. The Bellman




























where #¿ is the indicator variable for price adjustment in period ¿ which equals 0 with
probability µ, independently of any exogenous state variable.15 If the ¯rm adjusts in state




the value of the ¯rm conditional on price adjustment and local currency pricing.
Finally, ¹ V (st) is the continuation value de¯ned below which allows for the optimal choice of
the currency of pricing.
































where p¤ is the producer currency price of the ¯rm. The optimal price is then ¹ p¤(st) =
argmaxp¤ VP(p¤ ;st) and again we denote ¹ VP(st) ´ VP
¡
¹ p¤(st);st¢
. The continuation value is
then naturally de¯ned as ¹ V (st) = maxf¹ VL(st); ¹ VP(st)g.
Before discussing the optimal currency choice, we prove a familiar certainty equivalence
result which will be useful for our further analysis:
Proposition 1 Up to the second order, the optimal prices in the local currency for both
LCP and PCP ¯rms are equal to the weighted average desired price in all future periods and
¯rm in a given sticky price environment. As a result, pass-through into °exible prices can be di®erent from
pass-through into desired prices if, for example, strategic complementarities are important.
13Exchange rate is de¯ned in the standard way so that an increase in et corresponds to appreciation of
the foreign currency.
14All the results can be extended in a natural way to an environment with mean reversion in the exchange
rate, however this case is empirically less relevant and we omit it from the text for brevity.
15Note that expectations in (2) must be conditioned on whether the ¯rm adjusts its price since this may
a®ect endogenous state variables such as the intra-industry price level.
11states conditional on the preset price remaining e®ective. Formally,
¹ p(s




























where ~ p¤(st+`) = ~ p(st+`) ¡ et+` is the desired price in producer currency. Consequently, up
to the second order of approximation, ¹ p(st) = ¹ p¤(st) + et.
Proof: See Appendix ¥
Proposition 1, despite being standard in the monetary economics literature (e.g., see
Dotsey, King, and Wolman (1999)), has an interesting implication in the international con-
text when ¯rms are allowed to choose between local and producer currency pricing. Speci¯-
cally, Proposition 1 shows that two ¯rms pricing in di®erent currencies but similar in all other
respects will choose the same prices in local currency, conditional on adjustment.16 There-
fore, all the di®erences in pricing decisions between otherwise similar LCP and PCP ¯rms
should be purely short-run and should disappear at the instance of ¯rst price adjustment.
Now we turn to the question of currency choice. The di®erence in the value of local













so that the ¯rm would optimally choose LCP if L > 0, PCP if L < 0, and would be indi®erent
between the two if L = 0 (from now on we will omit this latter possibility for brevity). We
now introduce the following

















Proof: See Appendix ¥
Using Lemma 1, we can state the following general rule of currency choice:17
16This result relies on the random walk in exchange rate assumption. If exchange rate mean reverts, LCP
and PCP ¯rms will choose di®erent prices conditional on adjustment: Each ¯rm in response to an exchange
rate shock will adjust its prices by less in its own currency of pricing in anticipation that the shock will
eventually die out. As a result, LCP ¯rms will mechanically have lower measured pass-through. However,
empirically, exchange rates appear to be extremely persistent so that such considerations are unlikely to be
quantitatively signi¯cant.
17The only remaining step between Lemma 1 and Proposition 2 is to show that vart(et+`) = `¢var(¢et) / `,
which is a standard random walk property.
















and producer currency pricing otherwise.
One obvious conclusion that follows from Proposition 2 is that currency choice is irrelevant
for the ¯rm that adjusts prices every period (as L ´ 0 in this case). Our model under Calvo
assumption does not exactly incorporate the Engel (2006) setup as a special case since in
Engel's setup ¯rms adjust prices every period, however, they do so before observing the
current state of the world. If we rewrite the model under the assumption that when a ¯rm



























This is exactly the equivalence result of Engel (2006).
Another observation is that the covariance terms in (8) are not conditional on any con-
temporaneous variables. In other words, what is important for currency choice is the uncon-
ditional correlation of exchange rate shocks and desired prices independently of whether this
is a direct relationship or mediated by other variables. Finally, note that covariance-over-
variance terms are certain regression coe±cients which can be interpreted as pass-through
coe±cients. We will make this notion more precise below.
To proceed further with the analysis we make the following stationarity assumption:
Assumption 1 Pass-through elasticity



















depends only on time horizon ` and does not depend on initial state st.
This assumption can be viewed as a ¯rst order approximation and we use it to put some
structure on the time-series properties of pass-through. Next we state a simple result which
links the theoretical concept of pass-through elasticity introduced in Assumption 1 to an
empirically more operational concept of a regression coe±cient:18
18The proof of this Lemma relies on standard ¯rst order Taylor approximation and symmetry of the
distribution of exchange rate shocks and is omitted for brevity.
13Lemma 2 Up to the second order, theoretical pass-through elasticity is equivalent to the


















i.e. the response of the optimal Calvo price setting rule to the current shock to the exchange
rate. In other words, ¹ ª0 is the fraction of today's shock to the exchange rate the ¯rm will
optimally pass-through given that it adjusts its price at the moment of the shock. Note that
¹ ª0 is a measure of the medium-run pass-through as opposed to °exible price, or long-run,
pass-through which correspond to horizons when all other ¯rms have eventually adjusted
their prices. We will return to this discussion below.
With this de¯nition and using Lemma 2, we show the following result:
Proposition 3 Under Assumption 1, the su±cient statistic for currency choice is the medium-
run pass-through, ¹ ª0. Speci¯cally, the ¯rm will choose LCP whenever ¹ ª0 < 1=2 and PCP
otherwise.
Proof: See Appendix ¥
This result shows a direct link between optimal currency choice and medium-run pass-
through of the ¯rm. The result of Proposition 3 is fairly general and would survive in a
number of environments. The intuition for this result is that the desired pass-through of
the ¯rm before ¯rst adjustment of prices is what should matter for currency choice which by
itself is a mechanism of indexing the short-run price of the ¯rm to one or the other currency.
If Assumption 1 fails we would not obtain the sharp prediction of Proposition 3 anymore,
however, some average measure of desired pass-through elasticities f~ ª`g weighted using the
relevant probabilities of non-adjustment in respective periods fµ`g would still determine
the optimal currency choice. The extension of the result to a general menu cost model is
more complicated since in this case the ¯rm can optimally choose the instances of price
adjustment and they do not have to be the same under di®erent choices of currency of
pricing. In Section 5 we show numerically, under certain parameterizations, that there are
close similarities in the currency choice decision in a menu-cost model to those in the Calvo
model.
14It is important to note that with the stationarity Assumption 1, the optimal currency
choice rule is invariant to whether the ¯rm chooses currency every time it adjusts prices or
once and for all. This is consistent with our empirical ¯nding that only a few ¯rms change
the currency of pricing during the life of their goods.19
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the particular threshold of 1=2 is speci¯c to the second
order approximation of the value functions that we use. The result should be interpreted
more generally as follows: a ¯rm with a higher medium-run pass-though is more likely to
become a PCP ¯rm. Nevertheless, in Section 5, we show numerically for a particular model
of currency choice that this threshold of 1/2 is a fairly good approximation to the actual
optimal cuto®.
Proposition 3 allows us to formulate the following set of corollaries:
Corollary 1 If ~ ª` = ~ ª is constant over time, then currency choice should not be a®ected
by the amount of nominal rigidity, µ.
Corollary 2 If two ¯rms have the same amount of nominal rigidity (µA = µB) and ¯rm
A has a higher desired pass-through at all horizons (~ ªA
` ¸ ~ ªB
` for all `), then ¯rm B will
choose LCP whenever ¯rm A does so but the opposite will not always be true.
Corollary 3 If two ¯rms have the same increasing desired pass-through pro¯les (i.e., ~ ª`+1 ¸
~ ª` for all `), then a ¯rm with more nominal rigidity (µA ¸ µB) will always choose PCP
whenever the other ¯rm does so while the opposite will not always be true. This implies that,
all else equal, PCP ¯rms should on average have longer durations of prices and ¯rms with
shorter durations of prices should be more likely to become LCP.20
We will illustrate these corollaries with a hypothetical example in Figure 4. Later, in Sec-
tion 5, we provide a more speci¯c example from a calibrated model.
The left panel of Figure 4 plots the desired pass-through pro¯les f~ ª
j
tg for three ¯rms:
Firms A and B have steeper desired pass-through pro¯les than Firm C, which however has
a higher initial desired pass-through. As a result, Firm C has relatively high desired pass-
through on impact but a lower desired long-run pass-through than the two other ¯rms.
Finally, Firm B has desired pass-through strictly greater than Firm A at all horizons.
19Only 125 goods in the sample change currency during their life in the index. This empirical ¯nding
can also be consistent with small costs of changing the currency of pricing even in an environment where
Assumption 1 fails.
20This observation is consistent with the ¯nding in Gopinath and Rigobon (2007) that non-dollar ¯rms
have a slightly higher duration of prices than dollar ¯rms.























Figure 4: Desired Pass-through pro¯les, ~ ª
j
t (left); and corresponding Medium-run Pass-
though as a function of duration, ¹ ª
j
0(¿) where ¿ = 1=(1 ¡ µ) (right)
The right panel of Figure 4 in turn translates using (9) respective desired pass-through
pro¯les of these three ¯rms into our measure of medium-run pass-through, ¹ ª
j
0, as a function
of the expected duration of ¯rm's price, ¿j = 1=(1 ¡ µj). Proposition 3 shows that ¹ ª
j
0(¿j)
has to be compared with 1=2 to determine the currency choice. First, we observe that each
¯rm is more likely to become LCP when its duration is low: Firm A, C and B will become
LCP if their expected durations are less then 5, 4 and 3 months respectively. This illustrates
Corollary 3. Next, observe that ¯rm B for any given duration is more likely to become
PCP than ¯rm A since its desired pass-though pro¯le is strictly higher and as a result its
medium-run pass-through is also higher for any given duration. This illustrates Corollary 2.21
Lastly, note that both duration and the entire desired pass-through pro¯le are important
in determining currency choice. In the example above we cannot predict currency choice
based solely on long-run pass-through or desired pass-through on impact. Speci¯cally, ¯rm C
has a higher desired pass-through on impact than both other ¯rms but it will switch into
PCP only after ¯rm B does so, as we increase the duration of prices. Moreover, ¯rm A has a
higher long-run desired pass-through than ¯rm C, however it will switch into PCP only after
¯rm C does so, as we increase the duration. This illustrates the di®erence in the currency
choice rule in a multi-period setting as compared to a one-period ahead setting.
21We do not illustrate Corollary 1, as it is straightforward: when ~ ª` ´ ~ ª for all `, then ¹ ª0 ´ ~ ª for any
duration ¿.
163.2 Medium-run versus Long-run Pass-through
The previous section provides a sharp link between currency choice and medium-run ex-
change rate pass-through without requiring to specify the determinants of pass-through. In
this section, we examine two standard sources of incomplete pass-through, variable mark-ups
and imported intermediate inputs so as to describe circumstances under which medium-run
pass-through will di®er from long-run pass-through. We also de¯ne the empirical speci¯ca-
tion to be used in the next section.
First, we split the state space so that ht = (Pt;zt), where Pt is the sectoral price level
(in logs) and zt are all other state variables. We assume that shocks to et a®ects only Pt+`
for ` ¸ 0 and do not a®ect any leads or lags of zt.22 This assumption is introduced for
expositional purposes and can be easily relaxed.













where Q(¢) is demand for the ¯rm's exports and c¤(¢) is the log of the unit cost in producer
currency. Implicitly we have assumed that the ¯rm operates a constant returns to scale
technology since the unit cost function does not depend on the price of the ¯rm.23 Both
demand and costs of the ¯rm can be a®ected by shocks exogenous to the exchange rate.
The cost function can additionally be a®ected by the exchange rate directly if the ¯rm
uses imported intermediate inputs. We denote the elasticity of the unit cost in local currency




and interpret Á as the fraction of the cost of the ¯rm incurred in the producer's currency.24
When Á < 1, the ¯rm has limited incentives to adjust its local currency price since its
unit cost in local currency does not move as much. This is the imported inputs channel of
incomplete pass-through.
22Speci¯cally, zt may include idiosyncratic or aggregate productivity, overall demand conditions, and other
¯rm-speci¯c characteristics such as properties of production technology and menu costs of the ¯rm.
23Decreasing returns to scale are known to generate additional channels of strategic complementarities and
incomplete exchange rate pass-through (Burstein and Hellwig, 2007; Goldberg and Tille, 2005). However,
empirically it is hard to disentangle this channel from the variable mark-ups channel, which we introduce
below.
24Throughout the paper we will assume that Á is a constant. One example when this assumption is exactly
satis¯ed is the case of Cobb-Douglas unit cost function with the price of ¯rst and second inputs perfectly
stable in producer and local currencies respectively.





The optimal mark-up of the ¯rm (in logs) is then ¹ ´ ln[¾=(¾ ¡ 1)]: As a result, the desired
price of the ¯rm is de¯ned implicitly by
~ p(e;P;z) = ¹(~ p;P;z) + c
¤(e;z) + e: (11)

















where we denote ¡ ´ ¡d¹=dp and ¡P ´ d¹=dP.25 ¡ and ¡P measure the strength of
strategic complementarities in the model, or the extent of what is referred to as pricing-
to-market. This is the variable mark-ups channel of limited pass-through. The mechanism
of variable mark-ups for incomplete exchange rate pass-through was ¯rst proposed in the
seminal works of Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987) and later used in multiple papers.26
Note that the sectoral price level P is an endogenous variable determined in equilibrium
by the fraction of ¯rms adjusting their price and the respective sizes of these adjustments.
Conditional on z, the dynamics of the price level is determined by the shocks to the exchange
rate. We will assume that dPt+`=det depends only on ` and does not depend on the initial




















that is the response of the price of the ¯rm to the exchange rate shock when all other ¯rms
in the sector have had enough time to adjust to this shock.27 If prices are °exible, all ¯rms
25Many demand speci¯cations, like that in Atkeson and Burstein (2005) and Klenow and Willis (2006),
imply ¡ = ¡P. For CES demand, ¡ = ¡P = 0 and ¹ = const. In general, ¡ and ¡P are necessarily related
but do not have to be equal. A reasonable assumption is that ¡ ¸ ¡P ¸ 0.
26Note that when ¡ = ¡P = 0, which is in particular true under CES preferences and constant elasticity
demand, the desired pass-through of the ¯rm is always equal to Á and does not depend on the sectoral
price level and hence the prices of competitors. This means that the variable mark-up channel of incomplete
pass-through is shut down. Finally, when ¡ > 0, the desired pass-through is Á=(1+¡) < Á when the sectoral
price level is held ¯xed (e.g., competitors do not respond to the exchange rate shock); and when ¡P > 0,
desired pass-through is increasing in dP=de.
27Note that equivalently long-run pass-through can be de¯ned as ¹ ª1 ´ limt!1 ¹ ªt, where
¹ ªt ´ (1 ¡ ±µ)
P1
`=0(±µ)`~ ªt+`
so that indeed ¹ ª1 = ~ ª1.
18adjust instantaneously, thus dPt+1=det = dPt=det and hence ~ ª1 is also a measure of °exible
price pass-through. Finally, note that if ~ ª` has an increasing pro¯le, long-run pass-through
is higher than medium-run pass-through. ~ ª` will have an increasing (decreasing) pro¯le if
most competitors of a foreign ¯rm price in the local (producer) currency. This explains the
importance of coordination motive for currency choice.28 In the case of the U.S., it is natural
to assume that most competitors for a ¯rm price in dollars.
We summarize the discussion above in
Proposition 4 If strategic complementarities are important (speci¯cally, when ¡P 6=0), medium-
run and long-run pass-through are di®erent and °exible price pass-through is not a su±cient
statistic for currency choice. If the sectoral price index responds sluggishly to exchange rate
shocks, then medium-run pass-through is lower than long-run pass-through.
Finally, we mention that Á, ¡ and ¡P are important primitives that determine both pass-
through of the ¯rm at di®erent horizons, as well as its currency choice. The lower is Á, the
lower is the pass-through of the ¯rm at all horizons and the ¯rm is more likely to choose local
currency pricing. Comparative statics with respect to ¡ and ¡P are less unambiguous. An
increase in ¡, keeping ¡P constant, will a®ect pass-through and currency choice in the same
way as a fall in Á. However, ¡ and ¡P, in most cases, are likely to change simultaneously
and in the same direction. Moreover, a change in these parameters is likely to a®ect the
equilibrium dynamic response of the sectoral price index (dPt+`=det). As a result, general
predictions about the e®ect of ¡ and ¡P on pass-through and currency choice cannot be
made.29 We will investigate this link in more detail in a speci¯c model that we simulate in
Section 5.
Note that we considered only a certain type of real rigidity in this section namely strategic
complementarities. There are however other forms of real rigidities such as those suggested
by Basu (1995) which can also rationalize long-run pass-through di®ering from the medium-
run. In the empirical analysis, we will only provide evidence of the existence of some form
of real rigidities and it is not our goal to identify the particular source of real rigidity.30
28See Krugman (1980); Goldberg and Tille (2005); Bacchetta and van Wincoop (2005).
29CES preferences and constant elasticity demand (so that ¡ = ¡P = 0) constitute one special case which
yields particularly sharp prediction. In this case, Á is the only parameter that determines pass-through and
currency choice: pass-through is high and PCP is optimal when Á is close 1 and pass-through is low and
LCP is optimal when Á is close to 0. However, this case constitutes little theoretical or empirical interest for
the purpose of explaining incomplete pass-through and currency choice.
30Delayed price adjustment to shocks can also be rationalized in a sticky information model suggested by
Mankiw and Reis (2002). For a related empirical test of this model based on BLS consumer price data see
Klenow and Willis (2007).
193.2.1 Empirical Speci¯cation
In this section we introduce three empirical speci¯cations that we will take to the data in
order to test the theory of currency choice.
Using (4) and (11) we write explicitly the optimal price setting rules of a ¯rm:31













= £(L)[¹t + c
¤
t + et]; (15)
where £(L) represents the corresponding expected present value operator (conditional on
non-adjusting prices) and for brevity ¹t+` and c¤
t+` denote ¹(¹ pt ;Pt+`;zt+`) and c¤(et+`;zt+`)
respectively.
With this notation, we can write the size of the optimal price adjustment as
¹ xt ´ ¢¿1¹ pt ´ ¹ pt ¡ ¹ pt¡¿1 = £(L)¢¿1[¹t+` + c
¤
t+` + et+`]; (16)
where ¿1 is the most recent duration of the ¯rm's price (in the currency of price setting). In
words, the size of the optimal price adjustment is equal to the revision in the expectations
about the future path of optimal mark-ups, marginal costs and exchange rates. The following
proposition allows us to make the transition from (16) to an empirically identi¯able equation:
Proposition 5 When the exchange rate follows a random walk and up to the second order,





[et ¡ et¡¿1] +
¡P
1 + ¡
£(L)[Pt ¡ Pt¡¿1] + "(z
t): (17)
Proof: See Appendix ¥
Motivated by Proposition 5, we will estimate the following three regression speci¯cations:
¹ xt = ^ ª0[et ¡ et¡¿1] + "1(z
t); (18)
¹ xt = ^ ª0[et ¡ et¡¿1] +
¡^ ª1 ¡ ^ ª0
¢




T ´ ¢L¹ pT = ^ ª1¢LeT + "3(z
t); (20)
where ¿2 is the previous duration of the price of the ¯rm and ¢L denotes a life-long change
in the respective variable; speci¯cally, ¢L¹ pT is the di®erence between the last and the ¯rst
31Note that, according to Proposition 1, this is the optimal local currency price for both LCP and PCP
¯rms. A PCP ¯rm will set ¹ p¤
t = £(L)[¹t + c¤
t] in producer currency so that ¹ pt = ¹ p¤
t + et, given that by the
random walk property £(L)et = et.
20observed prices of the ¯rm and ¢LeT is the cumulative change in the exchange rate over the
life of the good.
Estimated coe±cient ^ ª0 is our proxy measure for the medium-run pass-through ¹ ª0. The
theory suggests that this should be the su±cient statistic for the currency choice of ¯rms
with higher values of ^ ª0 making the choice of producer currency pricing more likely. Further,
under the null of no real rigidities, a ¯rm should not react to exchange rate shocks that took
place prior to the most recent period of non-adjustment, which implies ^ ª1 = ^ ª0. Conversely,
when real rigidities are important, past changes in the exchange rate can e®ect current price
adjustments of the ¯rm through, for instance, their sluggish e®ect on competitors prices.
Therefore, the second speci¯cation allows us to estimate the importance of real rigidities
by testing the null that the coe±cient on the lag of exchange rate change is equal to zero.
Finally, the life-long speci¯cation produces a coe±cient ^ ª1 which we treat as a proxy for the
long-run (or °exible price) pass-through coe±cient ¹ ª1 = ~ ª1. We formalize this discussion
in32
Proposition 6 (a) ^ ªLCP
0 < 1=2 < ^ ªPCP
0 ; (b)When real rigidities are important, ^ ª1 6= ^ ª0.
(c)When ^ ª0 < 1=2 < ^ ª1, the ¯rm should choose LCP despite a high °exible price pass-
through.
4 Micro-level ERPT and Currency of Pricing
In this section, we empirically test the implications of the theory section, as summarized in
Proposition 6, for the relation between currency choice and pass-through. We also evaluate
the importance of real rigidities in the data.
To test these implications, as highlighted in the previous sections, we need a measure
of pass-through that is estimated from periods of price adjustment. This is an important
departure from empirical studies that use aggregate price indices, as was done in Section 2.
Given the low frequency of price adjustment observed in the data, aggregate price indices
are dominated by unchanging prices. Increasing the horizon of estimation to several months
so as to arrive at the °exible price pass-through does not solve this issue because around
30% of the goods in the BLS sample do not change their price during their life, i.e. before
they get replaced. Consequently, when estimating the pass-through using the BLS index
such prices have an impact on measured pass-through even at long horizons.
32We emphasize again that the particular threshold of 1=2 is speci¯c to the quadratic approaximation.
We however show in the numerical section that for certain parameter speci¯cations 1=2 is a fairly accurate
measure of the threshold.
21Another advantage of examining good level price adjustments is that we can distinguish
between the response of prices conditional on the ¯rst instance of price adjustment and
further rounds of price adjustment, in order to test for the importance of real rigidities.
The relevant estimate of pass-through for currency choice is related to the unconditional
covariance-over-variance between prices and the exchange rate. Consequently, the appro-
priate regression will have no other controls besides the nominal exchange rate. To more
transparently compare our regression estimates to other estimates in the literature, we will
include, as is standard in the literature, a control for the foreign country in°ation, domestic
in°ation and GDP growth. This is innocuous because the coe±cient on the nominal ex-
change rate for the countries in our sample changes very little if we do or do not include
these controls. This re°ects the fact that the nominal exchange rate has very low covariance
with these other variables. In all the regressions we include a ¯xed e®ect for each country
and primary stratum lower pair (mostly 4 digit harmonized code) and cluster the standard
errors to allow for correlation in the residuals within these pairs.
We ¯rst estimate the following equation, which is the counterpart to equation (18):





0 ¡ ^ ª
LCP
0 ) ¢ D ¢ ¢¿1et + Z
0
t°1 + ²1;t; (21)
where, as before, ¹ xt is the change in the dollar price, conditional on price adjustment in the
currency of pricing;33 ¢¿1et ´ et ¡ et¡¿1 and ¿1 is the duration of the previous price in the
currency of pricing. Recall that under the random walk assumption, ¢¿1et is the proper
measure of the revision in expectations about the path of the exchange rate accumulated
over the period of price non-adjustment. D is a dummy that takes the value of 1 when the
good is priced in the foreign currency. Zt includes controls for the foreign consumer price
level, the US consumer price level and US GDP.34
The results from estimation of speci¯cation (21) are reported in Table 2. The ¯rst row,
reports the results from pooling all observations. The pass-through, conditional on a price
change, to the cumulative exchange rate change, is 0:24 for dollar priced goods and 0:90
for non-dollar priced goods. Recall that these are our proxy estimates of the medium-run
pass-through which, according to the theory, should be a su±cient statistic for the currency
choice. The di®erence in these pass-through estimates is large and strongly signi¯cant, which
33In the BLS database, the original reported price (in the currency of pricing) and the dollar converted
price are both reported. We use the latter, conditional on the original reported price having changed. Since
the ¯rst price adjustment is censored from the data, we also perform the analysis excluding the ¯rst price
change and ¯nd that the results are not sensitive to this assumption.
34The data series for these variables was obtained from the IMF's International Financial Statistics
database. For consistency, we include the cumulative change in this variables over the period of price
non-adjustment. We also allow for these variables to e®ect pass-through di®erentially across dollar and
non-dollar priced goods.
22supports the prediction of the currency choice model. We estimate this speci¯cation for each
country and obtain similarly that there is a sizeable di®erence in the point estimate of dollar
and non-dollar priced goods. This di®erence is statistically signi¯cant at conventional levels
of signi¯cance for 9 out of the 11 countries. The exceptions are Spain and Canada.
In Table 3 we perform the same analysis except we restrict the sample of goods to only
di®erentiated goods, using the Rauch (1999) classi¯cation.35 We were able to classify around
65% of the goods using this classi¯cation. Here again we ¯nd strong evidence of a selection
e®ect. The average medium-run pass-through for dollar priced ¯rms is 0:24 and it is 0:96
for non-dollar priced ¯rms. This di®erence is also observed at the country level, with the
di®erence in the pass-through estimates being signi¯cant for all countries, except Spain and
Canada.
Next, we allow for lags in the exchange rate changes to a®ect current price adjustment
to test for the presence of real rigidities. We estimate




















¢ D ¢ ¢¿2et¡¿1 + Z
0
t°2 + ::: + ²2;t;
where ¢^ ªc
1 ´ ^ ªc
1 ¡ ^ ªc
0 for c 2 fLCP;PCPg and ¿2 is the duration of the previous price of
the ¯rm so that ¢¿2et¡¿1 ´ et¡¿1 ¡ et¡¿1¡¿2 is the cumulative exchange rate change over the
previous (the one before the most recent one) period of non-adjustment. In this speci¯cation
we also allow Zt to include lagged foreign and domestic in°ation.36
Speci¯cation (22) is the counterpart to equation (19) and the results are reported in
Table 4. This speci¯cation requires the goods to have at least two price adjustments during
their life. Since there are several goods that have only one price change during their life, we
lose about 30% of the goods when we move to this speci¯cation from (21) which required the
good to have only one price adjustment during its life. Nevertheless, we obtain very similar
estimates for speci¯cation (21) to those reported in Tables 2 and 3 when we estimate that
speci¯cation using only the goods that enter the sample for speci¯cation (22), i.e. those that
have at least two price adjustments during their life.37
From Table 4 we observe that medium-run pass-through is signi¯cantly di®erent between
dollar and non-dollar goods, as was the case in Tables 2 and 3. Moreover, quantitatively
35Rauch (1999) classi¯ed goods on the basis of whether they were traded on an exchange (organized),
had prices listed in trade publications (reference) or were brand name products (di®erentiated). Each good
in our database is mapped to a 10 digit harmonized code. We use the concordance between the 10 digit
harmonized code and the SITC2 (Rev 2) codes to classify the goods into the three categories.
36We have estimated the speci¯cation with lagged own price changes and ¯nd that the implied pass-through
estimates are very similar.
37This is consistent with our assumption that the exchange rate follows a random walk so that the current
change in the exchange rate is uncorrelated with the previous exchange rate movements.
23the estimates are very similar across these tables. In the ¯rst row of Table 4, for all goods,
the di®erence between medium-run pass-through of non-dollar and dollar ¯rms is 0.62 and
is highly signi¯cant. This is again the case when we look at the sub-samples of Euro and
Non-Euro countries. The pass-through for non-dollar goods for the Euro (Non-Euro) area is
64 (59) percentage points higher.38 This large and signi¯cant di®erence is also evident when
we restrict the sample to di®erentiated goods: it is 67 percentage points in this case.
The second ¯nding of Table 4 is that exchange rate shocks that took place prior to the
current period of adjustment have a signi¯cant e®ect on current price adjustments. This
supports the existence of strong real rigidities in pricing behavior across ¯rms. The ¯rst row
of Table 4 points out that the elasticity of current price changes to lagged exchange rate
shocks for dollar priced goods is 0.21, which is only slightly smaller than the response to the
contemporaneous exchange rate movement (equal to 0.25). This signi¯cant e®ect for dollar
priced goods is documented also for the sub-sample of Euro and Non-Euro countries and for
di®erentiated goods.39 For non-dollar priced goods the second rounds of adjustment are in
general small and insigni¯cantly di®erent from zero. This ¯nding is also consistent with the
endogenous currency choice theory that goods with low strategic complementarities should
price in producer currency.
It is important to stress that this result on real rigidities is of independent interest as
it provides evidence for a mechanism that can generate signi¯cant inertia in the response
of prices to shocks, much longer than the median duration of price rigidity. This is viewed
as essential for generating quantitatively signi¯cant non-neutralities to monetary shocks.
Evidence of this mechanism has been tested in recent papers by Klenow and Willis (2006)
and Burstein and Hellwig (2007) using consumer price data. One of the useful features of
international data for this purpose is that we have an observable cost shock, namely the
exchange rate, that is arguably orthogonal to idiosyncratic cost-shocks of ¯rms.
A third ¯nding from Table 4 is that pass-through after multiple rounds of adjustment
need not be as dramatically di®erent between local and producer currency pricing ¯rms.
This refers back to the point made in Section 3 that what matters for currency choice is
the medium-run pass-through and not the long-run pass-through. As is evident in Table
4, for all cases the di®erence between the dollar and non-dollar goods after two rounds of
adjustment is substantially lower than after one round of adjustment. For all goods, the
38There are not enough observations to perform a country-by-country analysis. For Germany and Japan
for which there are su±cient observations for both dollar and non-dollar goods we obtain similar results to
those reported in Tables 2 and 3.
39For the Euro (non-Euro) countries the elasticity of current price change to lagged exchange rate move-
ments is 0.14 (0.24) as compared to 0.23 (0.24) for contemporaneous exchange rate change. Similarly, for
the sample of di®erentiated goods the `lagged' elasticity is 0.21 versus the `contemporaneous' of 0.22.
24di®erence in ^ ª0 is 0.62, while the di®erence in ^ ª1 is 0.36, which is almost half the original
estimate. Similarly, for di®erentiated goods, the di®erence declines from 0.67 to 0.43. This
decline is also evident for the sub-sample of Euro and Non-Euro countries.40
This point is further developed in Table 5, which shows the results for speci¯cation (20)
where we perform the estimation using price changes over multiple rounds of adjustment













¢ D ¢ ¢LeT + Z
0
t°3 + ²3;t; (23)
where ¹ xL
T is the di®erence between the last observed new price of the good and the ¯rst price
in the sample; and ¢LeT is the exchange rate change over the respective period. We have,
therefore, one observation for each good that has at least one price adjustment during its life
in the sample.41 We refer to ^ ª1 as life-long pass-through; recall that it is our proxy measure
of the long-run pass-through. The life-long pass-through for dollar priced goods (¯rst line of
Table 5) is 0:51 which is more than twice the medium-run pass-through estimate. For the
Euro (Non-Euro) sample the estimate is 0.42 (0.59) and for di®erentiated goods the estimate
is 0.52. These estimates are again about twice as high as the estimates of the medium-run
pass-through.42
The life-long pass-through for all non-dollar goods, as well as for Euro, Non-Euro and
Di®erentiated sub-samples, are 0.92, 0.89, 0.93 and 0.99 respectively. These estimates are
generally not statistically signi¯cantly di®erent from complete pass-through. The di®erence
in life-long pass-through between all non-dollar and dollar goods is 0.42, again statistically
signi¯cant but substantially smaller than the di®erence in medium-run pass-through, just as
in Table 4.
It is important to emphasize that the measure of long-run pass-through for dollar goods
from Table 5 is substantially higher than the numbers obtained from the aggregate regressions
in Section 2. One reason for this is, is the fact that aggregate regressions include 30% of goods
whose prices do not change at all during their lives which signi¯cantly reduces the estimated
aggregate pass-through coe±cients. The presence of a large number of such goods in the
sample points towards a potentially important role of item substitutions in passing-through
exchange rate movements into the import prices. The current methodology of import price
40For these sub-samples, the di®erence declines from 0.64 (0.55) to 0.59 (0.25) respectively.
41One of the bene¯ts of this approach is that we retain the full sample of goods with at least one price
adjustment, unlike in speci¯cation (22) described in Table 4.
42We emphasize that the point estimates for the life-long pass-through of dollar items are in many cases
higher than 50%. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction that currency choice should be determined
by medium-run and not long-run pass-through, so that LCP is preferred when medium-run pass-through is
low even if long-run pass-through exceeds 50%.
25index construction by the BLS does not include price changes associated with substitutions,
owing to concerns with quality changes, and accordingly this channel is omitted.
5 Numerical Illustration
The purpose of this section is two-fold: First, we numerically evaluate the ability of a Calvo
and a menu cost model with variable mark-ups and imported intermediate inputs to match
some of the facts in the data. Second, we study numerically the primitive determinants of
both pass-through and currency choice in the simulated models. In particular, we look at
the exact values of cuto®s for the currency choice not bound by the simplifying assumption
of the theory section (i.e., quadratic approximation to the value function and Calvo price
setting).
The model allows for two channels of incomplete long-run pass-through | variable mark-
ups and imported intermediate inputs. We show that the model generates low long-run
pass-through and the Calvo model, unlike the menu-cost model, generates quantitatively
signi¯cant lagged adjustments to exchange rate shocks, as in the data. A ¯rm is more likely
to select into producer currency pricing the lower the elasticity of its mark-up and the lower
the share of imported inputs in its production function as this leads to higher desired pass-
through pro¯les. The threshold of the currency choice decision from Section 3 of 1/2 is also
shown to be a good approximation to the actual optimal cuto® in the simulation. We brie°y
describe here the setup of the simulation. For more details the reader is referred to the
Appendix.
Consistent with our partial equilibrium approach, we will focus on a single sector of the
economy. There exist a continuum of ¯rms in the sector indexed by i. Firm i in period t has
the following unit cost function in the local currency:
Cit = exp(Áiet ¡ ait);
where ait is the idiosyncratic productivity of the ¯rm and Ái, as before, can be interpreted
as the share of foreign-country inputs in the production cost of the ¯rm. This Ái captures
the imported intermediate inputs channel of incomplete pass-through: the smaller is Ái, the
more stable is the local currency unit cost of the ¯rm in response to exchange rate shocks.
We further assume that idiosyncratic productivity follows an autoregressive process:
ait = ½aai;t¡1 + ¾auit; uit » i:i:d:N(0;1):
We introduce variable mark-ups using Kimball (1995) kinked demand speci¯cation re-
cently analyzed by Klenow and Willis (2006) in the context of a closed economy general
26equilibrium menu cost model. This demand structure produces pricing complementarities
via the variable elasticity of demand even in a sector where each ¯rm has a negligible market
share. As shown in Klenow and Willis (2006), the relative demand function under Kimball
preferences is given by
'(xit) =
·
1 + ¹ ²ln
µ
Dt




where xit = exp(pit¡Pt) is the price of the ¯rm relative to the sectoral price level; and Dt is
an endogenous sectoral demand parameter. Since we take a partial equilibrium approach, we
¯x Dt ´ D > 1 as an exogenous constant. This demand function is conveniently governed
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When ¹ ² ! 0, demand collapses to a standard CES demand with constant elasticity ¹ ¾. As ¹ ²
increases, the super-elasticity of demand increases so that the elasticity of demand becomes
more and more sensitive to the relative price of the ¯rm.43 Finally, since the elasticity of
demand increases with the relative price of the ¯rm, the desired mark-up of the ¯rm decreases
with the relative price which is the essence of the variable mark-ups channel of incomplete
pass-through.
We now link this demand structure to the measure of strategic complementarity intro-
duced in Section 3.2. Recall that ¡ and ¡P are the elasticities of the desired markup with
respect to own price and sectoral price level respectively.44 When elasticity of demand is a
function of the relative price only, which is the case under Kimball preferences, we have




Therefore, strategic complementarities are stronger, the higher is the super-elasticity of de-
mand and the lower is the elasticity of demand. One can also show that ¡ increases in ¹ ² and
decreases in ¹ ¾.
Finally, we introduce price stickiness using both a Calvo model and a menu cost model.
Under Calvo speci¯cation, a ¯rms gets a chance to adjust its price with an exogenous prob-
ability (1 ¡ µ) each period. Therefore, 1=(1¡µ) corresponds to an average duration of ¯rm's
43In this sense, parameter ¹ ² governs the super-elasticity of demand, while parameter ¹ ¾ governs the elasticity.
However, strictly speaking, both parameters jointly determine elasticity and super-elasticity of demand.
44That is, ¡ = ¡d¹=dp and ¡P = d¹=dP, where ¹ = ln[¾=(¾ ¡ 1)].
27price. Under menu cost speci¯cation, the ¯rm endogenously determines the instances of
price adjustment and pays a menu cost · each time it adjusts. The ¯rms are assumed to be
homogenous with respect to µ and · under the two speci¯cations respectively.
5.1 Calibration
To simulate the model we ¯rst need to calibrate the underlying parameters:
f±; ¹ ¾;¹ ²;µ;·;¾a;½a;(Ái)g:
The values of the calibrated parameters are listed in Table 6. The period in the model
corresponds to one month and accordingly the discount rate is ± = 0:961=12. We set ¹ ¾ = 6
and ¹ ² = 8 which corresponds to ¡ ¼ 2. This generates a signi¯cant amount of strategic
complementarity in the model: Partial pass-through is equal to 1=(1+¡) = 1=3, that is only
1/3 of the idiosyncratic shock is passed-through into the price while mark-up absorbs 2/3
of the shock.45 At the same time, this parameter choice leads to the median °exible price
mark-up of roughly 60%, which corresponds to a median elasticity of demand of 2.6. This
is close to the median elasticity estimated by Broda and Weinstein (2006) using trade data.
Next, we choose fµ;·;¾a;½ag to match the median duration of prices of 11 months and
the average absolute size of price adjustment of 8%, as documented in Gopinath and Rigobon
(2007). Consequently, for Calvo model we set µ = 10=11. For the menu cost model we set
menu cost · to equal 3.5% of revenues of a typical ¯rm conditional on adjustment, which
corresponds to 0.32% of revenues on an annual basis and is similar to what is typically used
in recent macro literature. Finally, we set ¾a = 0:11 and ½a = 0:85, which implies substantial
idiosyncratic productivity shocks and is again standard in the literature following the work
of Golosov and Lucas (2007).
Lastly, we calibrate Ái, the fraction of foreign-country inputs in production costs, to be
discretely distributed between 0 and 1 as shown in Table 7. This implies that the costs
of ¯rms are di®erentially responsive to exchange rate movements, so that an exchange rate
shock is neither a pure aggregate shock, nor a pure idiosyncratic shock. We model in this
way the di®erence between local producers who have a low Á and foreign exporters who have
a high Á. We assume that 85% of the ¯rms are local producers with an average Á of 20%.
The remaining 15% of the ¯rms in the sector are foreign exporters with an average Á of 85%.
Thus, the sectoral average Á, both across local and foreign ¯rms, is equal to ¹ Á = 30%. This
45Recall that the optimal price is equal to markup over marginal cost, p = ¹ + c. Therefore, the response
of the price to an idiosyncratic marginal cost shock is dp=dc = 1=(1 + ¡) < 1 since the movements in the
desired markups in response to price adjustment partially absorb the cost shocks.
28calibration is broadly consistent with the data from input-output tables for the United States
and other OECD countries.46 As will be shown below, it is important to incorporate this
type of ¯rm heterogeneity into the model in order to match low pass-through into import
prices.
The shock we will consider is a one time permanent unanticipated change in the exchange
rate. Speci¯cally, we will assume that the exchange rate depreciates by 6%. This is calibrated
to be a two standard deviation shock to the nominal exchange rate, given that monthly
exchange rate volatility is around 3%.
5.2 Dynamic Pass-through Patterns
Before we describe the dynamic response of the economy, we ¯rst examine the long-run (or
°exible price) pass-through. As was shown in the theory section (see equation 14), each ¯rm










where dP1=de is the long-run response of the sectoral price level. Therefore, long-run pass-
through is a weighted average of pass-through into the individual unit cost (Ái) and aggregate
pass-through into the sectoral price index (dP1=de) with the weight on the latter increasing
in the amount of strategic complementarities (¡).47
Given our calibration, we ¯nd that the sectoral pass-through elasticity is ¢P1=¢e = 0:29
which is very close to ¹ Á = 0:30. Therefore, variable elasticity of demand and heterogeneous
response of the ¯rms to the shock do not lead to a signi¯cantly di®erent long-run pass-
through into the sectoral price index: Just as in the CES speci¯cation (¡ = 0) or if all ¯rms
have the same Á,48 long-run pass-through into the sectoral price is mainly driven by the
pass-through of the shock into the marginal cost of an average ¯rm.
However, the pattern is very di®erent for the sub-sample of importers. Under our
parametrization, the pass-through elasticity into the (sectoral) import price index is 45%
46We use the 2006 edition of the OECD input-ouput tables and estimate for each country in our sample the
share of imports that is used as inputs in domestic production, by sector. The sectoral average across these
countries is 15%. That is the Á for the average ¯rm exporting to the U.S. is calibrated to 0.85. Secondly,
for ¯rms exporting to the U.S., their competitors also include local U.S. ¯rms. From the U.S. input-ouput
tables we estimate, for the tradable sectors, that the sectoral average fraction of imports as a share of total
production is 15%.
47Under CES demand, ¡ = 0 and each ¯rm passes-through completely the change in its marginal cost. As
a result, the elasticity of the sectoral price index is simply equal to ¹ Á.
48Note that when all ¯rms have the same Ái's and respond symmetrically to the shock in the long-run,
they all simply pass-through completely the change in their marginal costs (even under non-CES demand)
so that relative prices do not change.
29though the average pass-through into marginal cost of importers is equal to ¹ ÁM = 0:85.
Consequently, importers pass-through on average only about 50% of the change in their
marginal cost. The intuition for this result is straightforward. Since importers' costs re-
spond to exchange rate movements much stronger than the costs of an average ¯rm in the
sector (i.e., Ái À ¹ Á for importers), the exchange rate shock for them is largely like an id-
iosyncratic shock; as a result, variable mark-ups absorb a signi¯cant fraction of this largely
idiosyncratic cost shock.49 Therefore, the Kimball demand speci¯cation is able to reproduce
low long-run exchange rate pass-through into import prices.






















Figure 5: Pass-through into sectoral and import prices
We now turn to the dynamic response of the ¯rms to a one time permanent unanticipated
exchange rate depreciation of 6%. For now we assume that all ¯rms price in the local
currency. This is a good ¯rst approximation to the data since over 90% of imports into the
U.S. are priced in dollars. We will address the issue of currency choice below. Again we
defer all the details of the simulation to the appendix and report here only the ¯nal results.
The left panel of Figure5 illustrates pass-through into sectoral and import prices for the
Calvo model and the right panel plots a similar graph for the menu-cost model. In the case of
the Calvo model the dynamic adjustment is gradual. Even after 10 months the pass-through
is about 1/3 and after 20 months it is still below 2/3 of that in the long-run. In contrast,
the dynamic response of the menu-cost model is rapid with about 1/2 of the long-run pass-
through taking place in the ¯rst 5 months. Therefore, a menu cost model does not generate







¹ Á = ¹ Á +
1
1 + ¡
(¹ ÁM ¡ ¹ Á):
Since ¹ ÁM > ¹ Á, increasing ¡ will force importers to pass-through less and less of the exchange rate shock.
30a lot of sluggishness in aggregate prices owing to the well known selection e®ect.50 Similar
patterns hold for the import price index.


























Figure 6: Desired pass-through (~ ªt) and actual pass-through conditional on adjustment (¹ ªt)
The di®erence in sluggishness of the aggregate price index under the Calvo and menu
cost speci¯cations translates into the di®erences in the desired and actual pass-through of a
typical foreign ¯rm as illustrated in Figure 6.51 The lower line in each panel corresponds to
the desired pass-through of the ¯rm, i.e. the optimal pass-through of a ¯rm with the same
characteristics, but which adjusts its prices every period in the given environment. The
upper line plots the actual pass-through of the ¯rm conditional on price adjustment. The
medium-run pass-through, as de¯ned in the theory section, corresponds to the value of the
actual pass-through on the day of the shock (i.e., at t = 1).
As is evident from Figure 6, desired pass-through of the ¯rm has an increasing pro¯le
under both price stickiness speci¯cations. This translates into the lower medium-run pass-
through as compared to the long-run pass-through. However, in the menu cost model the size
of this di®erence is small: a ¯rm adjusting on the day of the shock will already pass-through
90% of its long-run response and a ¯rm adjusting six periods after the shock will decide to
pass-through the optimal long-run amount. In the Calvo model, the results are quantitatively
di®erent. The medium-run pass-through is about 70% of that in the long-run which is closer
to our empirical estimate of 50%. Additionally, under this speci¯cation, a typical ¯rm will
have a number of price adjustments before it attains its long-run pass-through level.52
50Interestingly, this is not driven by an increased number of price adjustments on and after the date of
the shock, i.e. the fraction of ¯rms adjusting prices does not increase signi¯cantly after the shock happens.
51For illustration we take a ¯rm with the average idiosyncratic productivity and Ái = 1. The non-
smoothness of the curves in Figure 6 comes from the fact that we were computing the value and policy
functions on a grid.
52Also note that the desired pass-through on impact, which constitutes the lower bound on the medium-run
pass-through, is about 55% of the long-run pass-through in both speci¯cations.
315.3 Currency Choice in the Simulated Model
Lastly, we address the issue of currency choice in the simulated sticky price model. We
examine optimal currency choice by a marginal ¯rm with a given Á and ¡(¹ ²; ¹ ¾) placed in the
sector discussed above, where sectoral price level evolves after the exchange rate shock as
depicted in the left panel of Figure 5. This marginal ¯rm is too small to e®ect the sectoral
price index, consistent with Kimball preferences.
In a world in which ¯rms anticipate no exchange rate movements, currency choice is
irrelevant. Therefore, we will assume that a ¯rm expects the currency shock with nearly
zero probability, so that it does not a®ect its pricing decisions before the shock happens.
However, since it is costless, the ¯rm will specify in which currency it sets its price in case
of the low probability event of the exchange rate movement. This assumption allows us to
approximate a fully dynamic environment in which the exchange rate follows a random walk
process.
Figure 7 plots the results of this exercise. Speci¯cally, we ¯x ¹ ¾ = 6 and for each ¹ ² 2
f0;1;:::;5g we ¯nd a value of Á, denoted by ^ Á(¹ ²), which makes the ¯rm indi®erent between
local and producer currency pricing. For a given ¹ ², a ¯rm prefers local currency pricing if
Á < ^ Á(¹ ²) and producer currency pricing otherwise.


































































Figure 7: Currency Choice in the Simulated Model
The left panel of Figure 7 plots ^ Á(¹ ²) both under Calvo and menu cost speci¯cations.
Consequently, the region of local (producer) currency pricing is below (above) this curve for
each speci¯cation respectively. Since ^ Á(¹ ²) is increasing in ¹ ², the ¯rm is more likely to choose
local currency pricing the lower is its Á and the higher is its ¹ ² (which also corresponds to
a higher ¡). Recall that, consistent with the theory, both of these factors also contribute
to a higher pass-through of the ¯rm. Quite remarkably both menu cost and Calvo models
32have very similar predictions for the currency choice in this setting. Finally, note that no
¯rm with Á · 1 will choose producer currency pricing when the demand super-elasticity
parameter is ¹ ² ¸ 4:5.53 In other words, even foreign ¯rms which incur all their costs in the
producer currency will prefer to price in local currency when strategic complementarities
become strong enough.
The right panel of Figure 7 maps the indi®erence curves ^ Á(¹ ²) from the left panel into
medium-run and long-run pass-through. More speci¯cally, we take a ¯rm characterized by a
given ¹ ² and Á = ^ Á(¹ ²), so that it is indi®erent between LCP and PCP, and plot the medium
and long-run pass-through for this ¯rm against ¡(¹ ²; ¹ ¾).54 From this ¯gure we observe that a
¯rm should select producer currency pricing whenever its medium-run pass-through is above
roughly 50%: the exact threshold numbers are 0.465 when ¡ = 0 which increases to 0.515
when ¡ = 1. This is remarkably similar to our theoretical threshold of 1/2 which emerges
under the quadratic approximation to the value function of the ¯rm. Finally, note that when
strategic complementarities are weak (¡ ¼ 0), long-run and medium-run pass-through are
the same; they start to diverge, with long-run pass-through exceeding medium-run pass-
through, as strategic complementarities become stronger. For example, when ¡ = 1 a ¯rm
can have long-run pass-through as high as 70% and still choose local currency pricing since
its medium-run pass-through is low enough.
6 Discussion and Conclusion
We refer to pass-through over multiple periods of price adjustment as the long-run pass-
through. This is a signi¯cant improvement over using the aggregate price index because
the latter includes goods whose prices never change. However, an interesting feature of the
data is that there are a large number of goods that simply get replaced without experiencing
a price change during their life. It is reasonable to conjecture that a signi¯cant amount
of pass-through adjustment takes place when the ¯rm also changes the physical aspects of
the good. Accordingly the relevant long-run includes pass-through associated with product
substitutions. Estimating the importance of item substitution for long-run pass-through is
however outside the scope of the current paper and is left for future research.
While we test the mapping between currency choice and medium-run pass-through, it is
53This ¯nding makes internally consistent our assumption in the previous subsection that all ¯rms price
in the local currency since there we had ¹ ² = 8.
54We plot only the results for the Calvo model and the results for the menu cost model are nearly identical.
On the x-axis we map each ¹ ² for a given ¹ ¾ into ¡ according to (25). We then use Á = ^ Á(¹ ²) and obtained
¡(¹ ²; ¹ ¾) to construct the measures of medium and long-run pass-through which we plot on the y-axis. For
further details consult the Appendix.
33harder to empirically link the two concepts to underlying primitives. This is because of the
lack of detailed estimates on parameters such as the elasticity of elasticity of demand, market
shares, dollar-denominated costs, etc. What we do ¯nd in the data is that the probability
of pricing in non-dollars is signi¯cantly higher for a typical good in the di®erentiated sector
(based on Rauch's classi¯cation), which is consistent with theory.
To summarize, the topic of exchange rate pass-through has received extensive attention in
both theoretical and empirical literature in international economics. In the theoretical open
economy macro literature with nominal rigidities, the currency of pricing, which is assumed to
be exogenous in a large class of models, has stark predictions for di®erences in short-run pass-
through, but in the long-run pass-through's are the same. We show here that empirically,
even conditional on a price change, exchange rate pass-through di®ers dramatically between
¯rms that price in the local currency and those that price in the producer currency, which
is contrary to the prediction of models with exogenous currency choice. Instead, this is
consistent with currency choice being endogenous.
We present a model of endogenous currency choice in a dynamic staggered price setting
environment and show that medium-run pass-through is a su±cient statistic for currency
choice. This measure of pass-through depends both on the desired pass-through pro¯le over
time and on the durations of price non-adjustment. In the presence of real rigidities this
measure of pass-through can di®er from long-run pass-through. We use micro data on U.S.
import prices to show that the predictions of the model are borne out in the data. We also
provide evidence of signi¯cant real rigidities in price setting.
34Appendix
A Proofs of Results for Section 3
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and Op denotes a variable with the same order of magnitude in
the probabilistic sense. The ¯rst equality in (27) relies on the fact that ~ ¦p(s) = ¦p(~ p(s);s) ´
0, while the second requires smooth di®erentiability of the second derivative of the pro¯t










which proves the claim in the proposition about the LCP ¯rm.


















which completes the proof of the claim for the PCP ¯rm. ¥

















55This assures that ~ ¦pp(st+`) = ~ ¦pp(st) + ®.
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where each covariance term implicitly conditions on (st;#t+1=:::=#t+`=0). To make the
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Each covariance can be expanded as
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Finally, noting that ~ ¦pp(¢) < 0 by the second order condition of pro¯t maximization, we
arrive at (7). ¥
































which after some manipulations yields








56Note that we expand the pro¯t function state-by-state around the price of the ¯rm ~ p(st+`) only, holding
the state st+` constant and then use the fact that ~ ¦pp(st+`) ¼ ~ ¦pp(st). An alternative strategy, which
yields the same results, is to expand around the whole state vector (~ p(st);st) which then produces additional
redundant terms that should be canceled out. Our approach is less standard but more elegant and more
relevant in this context.
36Proof of Proposition 5: Consider ¯rst an LCP ¯rm. We can approximate (up to the
second order and omitting redundant constants) ¹t+` = ¡¡¹ pt + ¡PPt+` + g¹(zt+`) since
the approximation is done for the states in which the price of the ¯rm is ¯xed; similarly,
c¤
t+` +et+` = Áet+` +gc(zt+`). Using the pricing equation (15), this then yields the following
structural approximation:
¹ pt = ¡¡¹ pt + Áet + ¡P£(L)Pt + g(z
t);
where we have used the random walk property of exchange rate: £(L)et = et. Transforming
this pricing equation into the optimal size of price adjustment directly leads to the reduced
form (17).
Now we do the same steps for a PCP ¯rm. Since the price of a PCP ¯rm is ¯xed in the
producer currency, we have ¹t+` = ¡¡(¹ p¤
t + et+`) + ¡PPt+` + g¹(zt+`) so that in producer
currency the optimal price is
¹ p
¤
t = £(L)[¹t + c
¤
t] = ¡¡(¹ p
¤
t + et) + ¡P£(L)Pt + (Á ¡ 1)et + g(z
t)
Translating this into the local currency we again obtain
¹ pt = ¹ p
¤
t + et = ¡¡¹ pt + Áet + ¡P£(L)Pt + g(z
t);
which is equivalent to the approximate pricing equation for an LCP ¯rm. ¥
B Details of the Simulation in Section 5
The details of the Kimball demand are developed in Kimball (1995) and Klenow and Willis














where Cit = exp(Áiet ¡ ait). With this pro¯t function, we can write down the Bellman

















































57Under the Calvo speci¯cation the value of the ¯rm is simply replaced by V = µV N +(1¡µ)V A and the
policy function is respectively pit¡1 with probability µ and ¹ pit with probability 1 ¡ µ. Other features of the
calibration do not change.
37where V (¢), V N(¢) and V A(¢) denote respectively the value of the ¯rm, the value to the ¯rm
of non-adjusting its prices and the value of the ¯rm upon adjustment. We will also denote























There are two sets of ¯xed point problems in solving this model. First, once the value
function of the ¯rm is computed, we need to know the current state and, in particular, the
endogenous price level Pt to determine the optimal action of the ¯rm which in its turn a®ects















= ^ Pt; (29)
where !(¢) are the weights of the individual ¯rms in the price level aggregation and d©(¢) is
the equilibrium distribution of the types of the ¯rms. We use as weights the relative demand
functions of the ¯rms to obtain a better approximation to the ideal price index.58 Below we
describe how we solve for the equilibrium distribution of the types of the ¯rms.
The second ¯xed point problem arises in solving the Bellman equation of the ¯rms,
speci¯cally, in forecasting Pt+1 based on the observations of (et;Pt;:::). Since exchange rate
is the only aggregate shock, the innovations to the price level are driven exclusively by the
shocks to the exchange rate. Moreover, if there are no exchange rate shocks (et = const
with probability 1) and there exists a stationary distribution ©(¢), equilibrium price level is
constant. Additionally, after a one-time unexpected permanent exchange rate shock, price
level is no longer constant, however, its dynamics is fully predetermined. We will use these
two properties to solve the forecasting ¯xed point problem.
Speci¯cally, we will ¯rst solve for a (stochastic) steady state price level when exchange
rate is constant at di®erent levels. More formally, we will solve for ¹ P(e) which satis¯es (29)
given that et = e for all t and distribution ©(¢) is stationary. In computing the expectation
in the Bellman equation value functions, we will hence assume that Pt+1 ´ ¹ P(e).
Next we will solve for a dynamic response of ^ Pt when et jumps permanently from e0 to e1
at t = 1, the economy is originally in the steady state with ^ P0 = ¹ P(e0) and also ^ PT = ¹ P(e1)
for some large T at which a new steady state is achieved. The dynamic path of the price
58We also used a simple geometric average of prices, which is a ¯rst order approximation to the ideal price
index, and obtained very similar results.
38level f ^ PtgT
t=0 is predetermined in this case and thus the ¯rms have perfect foresight about the
price level. This allows us to iterate the value function of the ¯rm backwards starting from
t = T. Starting with an initially assumed f ^ PtgT
t=0, we iterate this procedure till convergence
to ¯nd a ¯xed point { the equilibrium dynamic response of the price level to exchange rate
shock.
We explain now how we obtain the equilibrium distribution of the types of the ¯rm. For
a given stationary exchange rate e and price level P, in initial period ¿, we sample a large
number N of ¯rms i characterized by a triplet (~ pi¿;ai¿;Ái), where we assume that initially
each ¯rm has a °exible optimal price












Using a transition probability matrix for ai¿ and the initial sample of ¯rms, we estimate
the equilibrium distribution of ¯rms in the next period ©(1)(pi¿;ai¿+1;Ái). Using the policy
function, we obtain next period prices for each ¯rm in our sample, which in turn allows us
to compute the equilibrium distribution next period, ©(2)(pi¿+1;ai¿+2;Ái). We iterate this
procedure till convergence when we obtain ©(pit;ait+1;Ái). The indicator of convergence is
that the price level stabilizes at some level which in fact is ¹ P(e). When the exchange rate
shock happens, we still keep track of this sample of N ¯rms which allows us to estimate the
equilibrium dynamics of the price level.
Finally, Figure 5 simply plots the equilibrium path of the price level, f ^ PtgT
t=0, as well as a
similar price index for importers (i.e, the ¯rms with Ái ¸ 0:75). To construct ¯gure 6 we plot
a policy function of a ¯rm with a mean realization of productivity shock (ait = 0) given that
it adjusts its price (not necessarily for the ¯rst time) t periods after the shock happens. This
corresponds to the actual pass-through conditional on adjustment. Desired pass-through is
simply the policy function of a corresponding °exible price ¯rm, i.e. ~ pit, which faces the
same dynamics of the price level after the shock, f ^ PtgT
t=0.
Currency Choice Simulation
As described above, the economy is in a stochastic stationary state at date t = 0 and at
date t = 1 a one-time unexpected permanent exchange rate shock happens. Now we assume
that exchange rate goes 6% up or down with equal probability, however, ¯rms setting prices
at t < 1 put zero probability on an exchange rate movement event. We look at a marginal
¯rm with pro¯t function as in (28), however, we now allow the demand of the ¯rm to have
di®erent parameters (¹ ²; ¹ ¾) than for the rest of the ¯rms. Once the shock happens, the ¯rm
39has a perfect foresight about the future path of the price level f ^ PtgT
t=0, which we take from
the previous simulation.
Our marginal ¯rm adjusts its price at t = 0. For concreteness we take a ¯rm with a mean
realization of productivity, ai0 = 0. At this stage it chooses whether to price in local or
producer currency. We normalize the initial exchange rate to e0 = 0. Therefore, at t = 0 the
¯rm charges ¹ pi0 in either currency. If it chooses producer currency, however, after exchange
rate shock happens its price in local currency becomes ¹ pi0 + e1, while it remains ¹ pi0 if the
¯rm chooses LCP. Therefore, to determine the ¯rm's optimal currency choice we need to
compare the expected value to the ¯rm at date t = 1 conditional on exchange rate shock
happening from having the price remain at ¹ pi0 or move to ¹ pi0 + e1. The expectation of the
value function is taken across two possible realization of e1 and across possible realizations
of ai1 given the initial productivity level ai0 = 0.
We denote the ¯rm's expected value function at date t = 1 conditional on exchange
rate movement by V e
1 (pj¹ ²;Á), where we emphasize the dependence of the value function on
demand parameter ¹ ² and cost parameter Á. Further, for each ¹ ² on a grid we solve for an











¹ pi0 + e1j¹ ²; ^ Á(¹ ²)
¢
:
We check that the value function di®erential










¹ pi0 + e1j¹ ²;Á
¢
is decreasing in Á for each given ¹ ². Therefore, the ¯rm with a given ¹ ² will choose LCP
whenever Á < ^ Á(¹ ²). This way we construct the left panel of Figure 7. To construct the right
panel of this ¯gure, we convert ¹ ² into ¡(¹ ²) according to (25) and compute the medium and
long-run pass-through according to
¹ ª0(¹ ²) =
^ Á(¹ ²)
1 + ¡(¹ ²)
+
¡(¹ ²)
1 + ¡(¹ ²)
X1
`=0(1 ¡ ±µ)(±µ)
` ^ P` ¡ ^ P0
e1 ¡ e0
;
~ ª1(¹ ²) =
^ Á(¹ ²)
1 + ¡(¹ ²)
+
¡(¹ ²)
1 + ¡(¹ ²)
^ PT ¡ ^ P0
e1 ¡ e0
:
These pass-through coe±cients correspond to a ¯rm indi®erent between LCP and PCP, i.e.
a ¯rm with (¹ ²;Á) such that Á = ^ Á(¹ ²). Since lower Á corresponds to lower pass-through
coe±cients, a ¯rm with demand parameter ¹ ² and a medium-run pass-through below ¹ ª0(¹ ²)
will choose LCP.
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43Tables
Country ND NND FracND
Germany 684 472 0.40
Switzerland 133 87 0.38
Italy 867 245 0.22
Japan 2,004 549 0.21
UK 580 139 0.19
Belgium 101 21 0.17
France 503 79 0.13
Sweden 159 22 0.12
Spain 233 28 0.11
Austria 83 10 0.10
Netherlands 133 15 0.10
Canada 1,823 83 0.04
Overall 7,303 1,750 0.19
Table 1: Number of Goods
Time Discount Factor ± 0:961=12
Kimball demand parameters ¹ ² 8
¹ ¾ 6
Calvo Frequency of Non-adjustment µ 10=11
Menu-Cost as a fraction of Revenue · 3:5%
Std. Dev of Idiosyncratic Shock ¾a 0:11
Persistence of Idiosyncratic Shock ½a 0:85
One-time Exchange Rate Shock ¢e 0.06
Table 6: Calibrated Parameter Values
Local Firms Importers
Á 0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00
PrfÁi = Ág 0.35 0.30 0.20 0.10 0.05
Table 7: Calibration of the Cost Distribution
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TABLE 2 
LOCAL Vs. PRODUCER CURRENCY PRICING  
 
  Local Currency    Producer Currency  Difference 
obs N   goods N   2 R  
 
LCP
0 ˆ Ψ   LCP t
0 ˆ Ψ    
PCP
0 ˆ Ψ   PCP t
0 ˆ Ψ  
LCP PCP
0 0 ˆ ˆ Ψ − Ψ   LCP PCP t
0 0 ˆ ˆ Ψ − Ψ       
All  0.24 8.94   0.91  21.78  0.67  13.96  35569  6637  0.11 
Germany  0.29 4.31   0.89  8.73  0.60  5.13  3332  801  0.22 
Switzerland  0.27 2.20   0.97  4.94  0.70  3.01  556  130  0.35 
Italy  0.21 3.29   0.88  6.31  0.67  4.31  2029  744  0.18 
Japan  0.23 5.95   0.95  16.20  0.73  10.86  6293  1733  0.14 
UK  0.19 1.66   0.69  4.84  0.51  2.91  2644  541  0.17 
Belgium  0.03 0.41   1.17  26.19  1.14  14.17  539  97 0.39 
France  0.27 3.88   1.07  10.97  0.80  6.27  1382  425  0.21 
Sweden  0.31 2.11   0.95  3.97  0.64  2.33  639  160  0.24 
Spain  0.46 3.26   0.92  2.47  0.45  1.13  756  164  0.20 
Netherlands  0.22 2.37   0.89  2.89  0.68  2.04  881  126  0.08 
Canada  0.19 1.32   0.82  1.64  0.62  1.28  16406  1654  0.03 
Note: All regressions include a fixed effect for every country and primary strata (mostly 4 digit harmonized codes) pair. t statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered by country*primary strata are reported. TABLE 3 
LOCAL Vs. PRODUCER CURRENCY PRICING: DIFFERENTIATED GOODS 
 
  Local Currency Pricing    Producer Currency Pricing  Difference 
obs N   goods N   2 R  
 
LCP
0 ˆ Ψ   LCP t
0 ˆ Ψ    
PCP
0 ˆ Ψ   PCP t
0 ˆ Ψ  
LCP PCP
0 0 ˆ ˆ Ψ − Ψ   LCP PCP t
0 0 ˆ ˆ Ψ − Ψ       
All 0.24  6.63    0.96  18.82  0.72  9.95  13575  3191  0.15 
Germany 0.44  4.34    0.92  7.32  0.48  3.11  1846  489  0.24 
Switzerland 0.19  0.83    0.97  2.98  0.78  2.04  358  78  0.32 
Italy 0.23 3.05    0.85  7.42  0.61  4.55  1029  409  0.18 
Japan 0.19  4.46    0.98  10.24  0.80  7.20  2725  838  0.16 
UK 0.32  1.57    0.91  5.51  0.60  2.31  846  277  0.15 
France 0.29  2.49   1.19  7.54  0.90  4.58 534  178  0.23 
Sweden 0.49  3.38    1.39  15.10  0.90  5.71  350  95  0.33 
Spain 0.51  4.04    0.75  6.30  0.24  1.20  458 97  0.17 
Netherlands 0.17  0.83    1.17  42.48  0.83  5.08  319  36  0.07 
Canada -0.13  -0.78   0.84  0.74  0.97  0.86  4945 619  0.06 
Note: All regressions include a fixed effect for every country and primary strata (mostly 4 digit harmonized codes) pair. t statistics calculated using robust standard 
errors clustered by country*primary strata are reported. TABLE 4 
LOCAL Vs. PRODUCER CURRENCY PRICING: STRATEGIC COMPLEMENTARITIES 
  
 
  Local Currency Pricing    Producer Currency Pricing 
obs N   goods N   2 R  
 
LCP
0 ˆ Ψ  
LCP LCP
0 1 ˆ ˆ Ψ − Ψ  
LCP
1 ˆ Ψ  
  PCP
0 ˆ Ψ  
PCP PCP
0 1 ˆ ˆ Ψ − Ψ  
PCP
1 ˆ Ψ  
Difference of 
0 ˆ Ψ  
Difference of 
1 ˆ Ψ  
   
All 0.25  0.21  0.46    0.88 -0.06  0.82  0.62  0.36  28913  4517  0.10 
 (7.73)  (10.27)  (10.82)    (14.84)  (-1.11)  (12.92)  (9.57)  (5.03)     
Euro 0.23  0.14 0.37    0.88  0.04  0.92  0.64  0.55  6542 1532 0.16 
 (5.39)  (4.31)  (6.79)    (7.37)  (0.55)  (8.61)  (5.01)  (4.59)     
Non-Euro 0.26  0.24  0.51    0.86 -0.10  0.76  0.59  0.25  22371  2985  0.08 
 (5.84)  (9.63)  (8.72)    (13.84)  (-1.32)-  (9.44)  (8.49)  (2.90)     
Differentiated 0.22  0.21  0.43    0.89 -0.03  0.87  0.67  0.43  10366  2050  0.16 
 (4.99)  (7.78)  (8.52)    (10.69)  (-0.49)  (9.21)  (6.95)  (3.92)     
Euro_diff 0.32  0.17  0.49    0.96 0.08  1.03  0.63  0.54  3042  806  0.18 
 (4.98)  (3.76)  (6.62)    (6.30)  (0.80)  (7.52)  (3.77)  (3.41)     
Non-Euro_diff 0.19  0.24  0.42    0.84  -0.02  0.81  0.65  0.39  7342 1256 0.15 
 (3.16)  (6.71)  (6.09)    (12.17)  (-0.27)  6.67 (6.83)  (2.73)     
Note: All regressions include a fixed effect for every country and primary strata (mostly 4 digit harmonized codes) pair. t statistics calculated using robust standard errors clustered by country*primary 
strata are reported.  
 TABLE 5 
LOCAL Vs. PRODUCER CURRENCY PRICING: LIFE CHANGES 
 
 Local  Currency  Pricing    Producer Currency Pricing  Difference. 
obs N  
2 R  
 
∞ Ψ ˆ  
∞ Ψ ˆ t  
 
∞ Ψ ˆ  
∞ Ψ ˆ t  
LCP PCP
∞ ∞ Ψ − Ψ  
LCP PCP t
∞ ∞ Ψ − Ψ     
All 0.51  8.06    0.92  15.02  0.42  4.98  6640  0.37 
                  
Euro 0.42  4.89    0.89  11.51  0.47  3.95  2372  0.49 
                  
Non-Euro 0.59  6.72    0.93  8.20  0.33  2.48  4268  0.32 
                  
Differentiated  0.52 5.60    0.99  12.45  0.47  3.86 3190  0.38 
                  
Euro_diff 0.50  4.47    0.92  9.67  0.42  2.58  1262  0.48 
                  
Non-Euro_diff 0.54  3.72    1.04  5.38  0.50  2.06  1928  0.32 
                  
Note: All regressions include a fixed effect for every country and primary strata (mostly 4 digit harmonized codes) pair. t statistics calculated using robust standard errors 
clustered by country*primary strata are reported. 
 
 